Throttling Authentication Attempts

CAS provides a facility for limiting failed login attempts to support password guessing and related abuse scenarios. A couple strategies are provided for tracking failed attempts:

  1. Source IP - Limit successive failed logins against any username from the same IP address.
  2. Source IP and username - Limit successive failed logins against a particular user from the same IP address.

It would be straightforward to develop new components that implement alternative strategies.

All login throttling components that ship with CAS limit successive failed login attempts that exceed a threshold rate in failures per second. The following properties are provided to define the failure rate.

  • failureRangeInSeconds - Period of time in seconds during which the threshold applies.
  • failureThreshold - Number of failed login attempts permitted in the above period.

A failure rate of more than 1 per 3 seconds is indicative of an automated authentication attempt, which is a reasonable basis for throttling policy. Regardless of policy care should be taken to weigh security against access; overly restrictive policies may prevent legitimate authentication attempts.

High Availability Considerations for Throttling

All of the throttling components are suitable for a CAS deployment that satisfies the recommended HA architecture. In particular deployments with multiple CAS nodes behind a load balancer configured with session affinity can use either in-memory or inspektr components. It is instructive to discuss the rationale. Since load balancer session affinity is determined by source IP address, which is the same criterion by which throttle policy is applied, an attacker from a fixed location should be bound to the same CAS server node for successive authentication attempts. A distributed attack, on the other hand, where successive request would be routed indeterminately, would cause haphazard tracking for in-memory CAS components since attempts would be split across N systems. However, since the source varies, accurate accounting would be pointless since the throttling components themselves assume a constant source IP for tracking purposes. The login throttling components are simply not sufficient for detecting or preventing a distributed password brute force attack.

For stateless CAS clusters where there is no session affinity, the in-memory components may afford some protection but they cannot apply the rate strictly since requests to CAS hosts would be split across N systems. The inspektr components, on the other hand, fully support stateless clusters.


IP Address

Uses a memory map to prevent successive failed login attempts from the same IP address.

<alias name="inMemoryIpAddressThrottle" alias="authenticationThrottle" />

IP Address and Username

Uses a memory map to prevent successive failed login attempts for a particular username from the same IP address.

<alias name="inMemoryIpAddressUsernameThrottle" alias="authenticationThrottle" />

Inspektr + JDBC

Queries the data source used by the CAS audit facility to prevent successive failed login attempts for a particular username from the same IP address. This component requires that the inspektr library used for CAS auditing be configured with JdbcAuditTrailManager, which writes audit data to a database.

<alias name="inspektrIpAddressUsernameThrottle" alias="authenticationThrottle" />
<import resource="classpath:inspektr-throttle-jdbc-config.xml" />

For additional instructions on how to configure auditing via Inspektr, please review the following guide.


Login throttling configuration consists of: