WORKERS AHEAD!
You are viewing the development documentation for the Apereo CAS server. The functionality presented here is not officially released yet. This is a work in progress and will be continually updated as development moves forward. You are most encouraged to test the changes presented.
Verifiable Credentials - OpenID Connect Authentication
OpenID Connect Authentication can be used in conjunction with Verifiable Credentials to provide a secure and decentralized way of verifying user identities. Verifiable Credentials are digital credentials that can be issued by trusted authorities and can be presented by users to prove their identity or attributes.
The following capabilities are in place:
- Issuer metadata is published via the
.well-known/openid-credential-issuerendpoint. - CAS may issue credentials formats such as
SD-JWT VC(selective disclosure), etc. - Dedicated endpoints for credential issuance and nonce generation are available.
Overview
Support is enabled by including the following module in the overlay:
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<dependency>
<groupId>org.apereo.cas</groupId>
<artifactId>cas-server-support-oidc-vc</artifactId>
<version>${cas.version}</version>
</dependency>
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implementation "org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-oidc-vc:${project.'cas.version'}"
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dependencyManagement {
imports {
mavenBom "org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-bom:${project.'cas.version'}"
}
}
dependencies {
implementation "org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-oidc-vc"
}
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dependencies {
/*
The following platform references should be included automatically and are listed here for reference only.
implementation enforcedPlatform("org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-bom:${project.'cas.version'}")
implementation platform(org.springframework.boot.gradle.plugin.SpringBootPlugin.BOM_COORDINATES)
*/
implementation "org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-oidc-vc"
}
The following settings and properties are available from the CAS configuration catalog:
cas.authn.oidc.vc.issuer.credential-configurations.[key].claims=
Collection of claim definitions supported by this credential configuration. The map key is the logical claim name that will appear in the issued credential, while the value describes how that claim is sourced, typed, and enforced. Claim definitions are typically used to map resolved principal attributes into the final credential payload.
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cas.authn.oidc.vc.issuer.credential-configurations.[key].credential-signing-alg-values-supported=ES256,RS256
Lists the signing algorithms supported by the issuer when producing
the credential for this configuration.
These algorithm identifiers are typically JOSE signature algorithms
such as
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cas.authn.oidc.vc.issuer.credential-configurations.[key].cryptographic-binding-methods-supported=jwk
Lists the supported cryptographic binding methods for this credential.
These values indicate how the issued credential may be bound to key material
controlled by the wallet or holder.
A common value is
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cas.authn.oidc.vc.issuer.credential-configurations.[key].format=
Defines the credential format issued for this configuration. Typical values depend on the verifiable credential profile supported by the issuer, such as JWT-based or SD-JWT-based credentials. This value is published in issuer metadata and is used by wallets to determine how the credential request and response should be processed.
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cas.authn.oidc.vc.issuer.credential-configurations.[key].proof-signing-alg-values-supported=ES256,RS256
Lists the signing algorithms supported for proof validation when the wallet submits proof material as part of a credential request. These values represent the algorithms CAS accepts when verifying proof-of-possession tokens or JWT-based proofs presented by the holder.
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cas.authn.oidc.vc.issuer.credential-configurations.[key].scope=
OAuth scope associated with this credential configuration. This scope may be used during authorization and token issuance to indicate that the client or wallet is requesting permission to obtain this specific type of verifiable credential.
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cas.authn.oidc.vc.issuer.nonce-ttl=PT60S
Control how long a nonce should last. This settings supports the
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cas.authn.oidc.vc.issuer.credential-configurations.[key].cryptographic-binding-methods-supported=jwk
Lists the supported cryptographic binding methods for this credential.
These values indicate how the issued credential may be bound to key material
controlled by the wallet or holder.
A common value is
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This CAS feature is able to accept signing and encryption crypto keys. In most scenarios if keys are not provided, CAS will auto-generate them. The following instructions apply if you wish to manually and beforehand create the signing and encryption keys.
Note that if you are asked to create a JWK of a certain size for the key, you are to use the following set of commands to generate the token:
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wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/apereo/cas/master/etc/jwk-gen.jar
java -jar jwk-gen.jar -t oct -s [size]
The outcome would be similar to:
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{
"kty": "oct",
"kid": "...",
"k": "..."
}
The generated value for k needs to be assigned to the relevant CAS settings. Note that keys generated via
the above algorithm are processed by CAS using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm which is a
specification for the encryption of electronic data established by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Configuration Metadata
The collection of configuration properties listed in this section are automatically generated from the CAS source and components that contain the actual field definitions, types, descriptions, modules, etc. This metadata may not always be 100% accurate, or could be lacking details and sufficient explanations.
Be Selective
This section is meant as a guide only. Do NOT copy/paste the entire collection of settings into your CAS configuration; rather pick only the properties that you need. Do NOT enable settings unless you are certain of their purpose and do NOT copy settings into your configuration only to keep them as reference. All these ideas lead to upgrade headaches, maintenance nightmares and premature aging.
YAGNI
Note that for nearly ALL use cases, declaring and configuring properties listed here is sufficient. You should NOT have to explicitly massage a CAS XML/Java/etc configuration file to design an authentication handler, create attribute release policies, etc. CAS at runtime will auto-configure all required changes for you. If you are unsure about the meaning of a given CAS setting, do NOT turn it on without hesitation. Review the codebase or better yet, ask questions to clarify the intended behavior.
Naming Convention
Property names can be specified in very relaxed terms. For instance cas.someProperty, cas.some-property, cas.some_property are all valid names. While all
forms are accepted by CAS, there are certain components (in CAS and other frameworks used) whose activation at runtime is conditional on a property value, where
this property is required to have been specified in CAS configuration using kebab case. This is both true for properties that are owned by CAS as well as those
that might be presented to the system via an external library or framework such as Spring Boot, etc.
When possible, properties should be stored in lower-case kebab format, such as cas.property-name=value.
The only possible exception to this rule is when naming actuator endpoints; The name of the
actuator endpoints (i.e. ssoSessions) MUST remain in camelCase mode.
Settings and properties that are controlled by the CAS platform directly always begin with the prefix cas. All other settings are controlled and provided
to CAS via other underlying frameworks and may have their own schemas and syntax. BE CAREFUL with
the distinction. Unrecognized properties are rejected by CAS and/or frameworks upon which CAS depends. This means if you somehow misspell a property definition
or fail to adhere to the dot-notation syntax and such, your setting is entirely refused by CAS and likely the feature it controls will never be activated in the
way you intend.
Validation
Configuration properties are automatically validated on CAS startup to report issues with configuration binding, especially if defined CAS settings cannot be recognized or validated by the configuration schema. Additional validation processes are also handled via Configuration Metadata and property migrations applied automatically on startup by Spring Boot and family.
Indexed Settings
CAS settings able to accept multiple values are typically documented with an index, such as cas.some.setting[0]=value. The index [0] is meant to be
incremented by the adopter to allow for distinct multiple configuration blocks.
Flow
The flow starts with CAS publishing issuer metadata at /.well-known/openid-credential-issuer. This
document advertises the issuer identifier, the credential endpoint, supported credential
configurations, and, when implemented, the nonce endpoint. Wallets use this metadata to
discover what CAS can issue and how to interact with it.
Before requesting a credential, the wallet obtains authorization using OAuth 2.0 mechanisms associated with the credential issuer or its authorization server. OIDC4VCI is explicitly built on OAuth 2.0, and the wallet uses OAuth authorization to gain the right to receive one or more credentials from the issuer.
Once the wallet has an access token, CAS uses its existing access token and
principal resolution machinery to identify the authenticated subject.
At this point, CAS has the Principal and its attributes, which become the source
data for the credential claims that may be issued.
CAS then selects the requested credential_configuration_id from issuer
metadata and maps principal attributes into credential claims according to
that configuration. In practice, this is typically configuration-driven, so
each claim definition identifies its source principal attribute, whether it
is mandatory, and how it should be typed or normalized before issuance.
When credential binding is required, the wallet sends a proof with the credential request to demonstrate possession of the key material to which the credential should be bound. OIDC4VCI supports proof-based issuance so that the issued credential can be tied to wallet-controlled cryptographic material rather than being just a bearer artifact.
The wallet calls the credential endpoint with its access token, the requested credential configuration, and, if required, the proof. CAS validates the access token, validates the proof, checks the requested credential configuration, resolves claims from the principal, and prepares the credential payload for issuance.
After claims are prepared, CAS signs the credential using its issuer key material. For JWT-based credential formats, this can reuse the same underlying JWS signing infrastructure CAS already uses for ID tokens, although the credential payload is distinct from an ID token and follows verifiable credential format rules instead.
Nonce Proof
Proofs are expected to carry a nonce claims. The nonce lets CAS tell whether the wallet’s
proof is fresh, instead of a replay. In OIDC4VCI, the wallet sends a proof showing it controls
the key the credential should be bound to, and the spec says c_nonce is the main defense
against replay of that proof.
Without a nonce, an attacker who somehow gets hold of a previously valid proof could try to send it again and get a duplicate credential issued to the same key.
In practical terms, the flow is:
- Wallet asks CAS for a fresh c_nonce from the nonce endpoint.
- Wallet builds its proof and includes that nonce.
- CAS checks that the nonce matches one it issued, is still fresh, and has not already been used.
- CAS consumes it so the same proof cannot be replayed.