OpenID Connect Federation Protocol

The CAS server supports the OpenID Federation protocol.

It can act as only one of the following roles (mutually exclusive):

  • Trust Anchor (TA)
  • Intermediate
  • OpenID Provider (OP)

Support is enabled by including the following dependency in the WAR overlay:

1
2
3
4
5
<dependency>
    <groupId>org.apereo.cas</groupId>
    <artifactId>cas-server-support-oidc-federation</artifactId>
    <version>${cas.version}</version>
</dependency>
1
implementation "org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-oidc-federation:${project.'cas.version'}"
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
dependencyManagement {
    imports {
        mavenBom "org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-bom:${project.'cas.version'}"
    }
}

dependencies {
    implementation "org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-oidc-federation"
}
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
dependencies {
    /*
        The following platform references are included automatically and are listed for reference only.

        implementation enforcedPlatform("org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-bom:${project.'cas.version'}")
        implementation platform(org.springframework.boot.gradle.plugin.SpringBootPlugin.BOM_COORDINATES)
        
    */
    implementation "org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-oidc-federation"
}

Configuration

The following settings and properties are available from the CAS configuration catalog:

cas.authn.oidc.federation.authority-hintsThe List of federation authorities where this entity is enrolled, i.e. its immediate superiors.
no default
Required

The List of federation authorities where this entity is enrolled, i.e. its immediate superiors. This is used to generate the federation metadata. When no trust anchors are defined, the entries are also considered trust anchors when validating incoming federation requests from relying parties.

Type
List<String>
Default
none
Defined by
OidcFederationProperties
cas.authn.oidc.federation.contactsList of contacts to include in the federation metadata.
no default
Required

List of contacts to include in the federation metadata.

Type
List<String>
Default
none
Defined by
OidcFederationProperties
cas.authn.oidc.federation.jwks-filePath to the JWKS file resource used to handle signing of federation metadata.
file:/etc/cas/config/federation-keystore.jwks
RequiredSpEL

Path to the JWKS file resource used to handle signing of federation metadata. Note that if the keystore file does not exist at the specified path, one will be generated for you, with a current and a future key. Keys are rotated and retired in this file, so it must be writable when rotation or revocation is used.

Type
String
Default
file:/etc/cas/config/federation-keystore.jwks
Defined by
OidcFederationProperties
Supports
Spring Expression Language
cas.authn.oidc.federation.organizationOrganization name to include in the federation metadata.
Apereo CAS
Required

Organization name to include in the federation metadata.

Type
String
Default
Apereo CAS
Defined by
OidcFederationProperties
cas.authn.oidc.federation.roleThe role of this server.
no default
Required
The role of this server. Available values are as follows:
  • TRUST_ANCHOR: The root of trust entity issuing statements about other entities.
  • INTERMEDIATE: Intermediate entity between the trust anchor and the leaf entities.
  • OPENID_PROVIDER: Leaf entity playing the OpenID Connect provider protocol role.
Type
OidcFederationRole
Default
none
Defined by
OidcFederationProperties
cas.authn.oidc.federation.entity-statement-expirationSets the time period during which the entity statement is not expired.
P90D
Duration

Sets the time period during which the entity statement is not expired.

Type
String
Default
P90D
Defined by
OidcFederationProperties
cas.authn.oidc.federation.issued-trust-marks
no default
Type
List<OidcFederationIssuedTrustMarkProperties>
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.issued-trust-marks[0].delegation
no default
Type
String
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.issued-trust-marks[0].expiration
P30D
Type
String
Default
P30D
cas.authn.oidc.federation.issued-trust-marks[0].logo-uri
no default
Type
String
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.issued-trust-marks[0].ref
no default
Type
String
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.issued-trust-marks[0].subjects
no default
Type
List<String>
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.issued-trust-marks[0].trust-mark-type
no default
Type
String
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.max-authority-hints
5
Type
Integer
Default
5
cas.authn.oidc.federation.max-concurrent-resolutions
10
Type
Integer
Default
10
cas.authn.oidc.federation.max-path-length
3
Type
Integer
Default
3
cas.authn.oidc.federation.max-requests-per-resolution
50
Type
Integer
Default
50
cas.authn.oidc.federation.required-trust-marks
no default
Type
List<String>
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.resolution-timeout
PT10S
Type
String
Default
PT10S
cas.authn.oidc.federation.resolve-endpoint-authentication
none
Type
OidcFederationEndpointAuthenticationModes
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.revocation.schedule.cron-expression
no default
Type
String
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.revocation.schedule.cron-time-zone
no default
Type
String
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.revocation.schedule.enabled
true
Type
Boolean
Default
true
cas.authn.oidc.federation.revocation.schedule.enabled-on-host
.*
Type
String
Default
.*
cas.authn.oidc.federation.revocation.schedule.repeat-interval
PT2M
Type
String
Default
PT2M
cas.authn.oidc.federation.revocation.schedule.start-delay
PT15S
Type
String
Default
PT15S
cas.authn.oidc.federation.rotation.schedule.cron-expression
no default
Type
String
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.rotation.schedule.cron-time-zone
no default
Type
String
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.rotation.schedule.enabled
true
Type
Boolean
Default
true
cas.authn.oidc.federation.rotation.schedule.enabled-on-host
.*
Type
String
Default
.*
cas.authn.oidc.federation.rotation.schedule.repeat-interval
PT2M
Type
String
Default
PT2M
cas.authn.oidc.federation.rotation.schedule.start-delay
PT15S
Type
String
Default
PT15S
cas.authn.oidc.federation.subordinate-directoryFor a TA or intermediate, the file directory where the subordinates are stored.
no default

For a TA or intermediate, the file directory where the subordinates are stored.

Type
String
Default
none
Defined by
OidcFederationProperties
cas.authn.oidc.federation.trust-anchors
no default
Type
List<OidcFederationTrustAnchorProperties>
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.trust-anchors[0].entity-id
no default
Type
String
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.trust-anchors[0].jwks
no default
Type
String
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.trust-mark-endpoint-authentication
none
Type
OidcFederationEndpointAuthenticationModes
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.trust-mark-issuers
no default
Type
List<OidcFederationTrustMarkIssuerProperties>
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.trust-mark-issuers[0].issuers
no default
Type
List<String>
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.trust-mark-issuers[0].trust-mark-type
no default
Type
String
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.trust-mark-owners
no default
Type
List<OidcFederationTrustMarkOwnerProperties>
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.trust-mark-owners[0].jwks
no default
Type
String
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.trust-mark-owners[0].owner
no default
Type
String
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.trust-mark-owners[0].trust-mark-type
no default
Type
String
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.trust-marks
no default
Type
List<String>
Default
none
cas.authn.oidc.federation.unresolved-entity-retention
PT5M
Type
String
Default
PT5M

Required settings may be needed to activate or affect the feature; review them even when they have a default. Optional settings only need to be set to change a default or to turn on the behavior they control. Third party settings belong to libraries such as Spring Boot that CAS builds on; their own documentation may have more detail.

Notes on configuration

Configuration Metadata

The collection of configuration properties listed in this section are automatically generated from the CAS source and components that contain the actual field definitions, types, descriptions, modules, etc. This metadata may not always be 100% accurate, or could be lacking details and sufficient explanations.

Be Selective

This section is meant as a guide only. Do NOT copy/paste the entire collection of settings into your CAS configuration; rather pick only the properties that you need. Do NOT enable settings unless you are certain of their purpose and do NOT copy settings into your configuration only to keep them as reference. All these ideas lead to upgrade headaches, maintenance nightmares and premature aging.

YAGNI

Note that for nearly ALL use cases, declaring and configuring properties listed here is sufficient. You should NOT have to explicitly massage a CAS XML/Java/etc configuration file to design an authentication handler, create attribute release policies, etc. CAS at runtime will auto-configure all required changes for you. If you are unsure about the meaning of a given CAS setting, do NOT turn it on without hesitation. Review the codebase or better yet, ask questions to clarify the intended behavior.

Naming Convention

Property names can be specified in very relaxed terms. For instance cas.someProperty, cas.some-property, cas.some_property are all valid names. While all forms are accepted by CAS, there are certain components (in CAS and other frameworks used) whose activation at runtime is conditional on a property value, where this property is required to have been specified in CAS configuration using kebab case. This is both true for properties that are owned by CAS as well as those that might be presented to the system via an external library or framework such as Spring Boot, etc.

:information_source: Note

When possible, properties should be stored in lower-case kebab format, such as cas.property-name=value. The only possible exception to this rule is when naming actuator endpoints; The name of the actuator endpoints (i.e. ssoSessions) MUST remain in camelCase mode.

Settings and properties that are controlled by the CAS platform directly always begin with the prefix cas. All other settings are controlled and provided to CAS via other underlying frameworks and may have their own schemas and syntax. BE CAREFUL with the distinction. Unrecognized properties are rejected by CAS and/or frameworks upon which CAS depends. This means if you somehow misspell a property definition or fail to adhere to the dot-notation syntax and such, your setting is entirely refused by CAS and likely the feature it controls will never be activated in the way you intend.

Validation

Configuration properties are automatically validated on CAS startup to report issues with configuration binding, especially if defined CAS settings cannot be recognized or validated by the configuration schema. Additional validation processes are also handled via Configuration Metadata and property migrations applied automatically on startup by Spring Boot and family.

Indexed Settings

CAS settings able to accept multiple values are typically documented with an index, such as cas.some.setting[0]=value. The index [0] is meant to be incremented by the adopter to allow for distinct multiple configuration blocks.

Subordinates

In OpenID Connect Federation, a subordinate is an entity that is “below” another federation entity in the trust hierarchy. Simply put, a subordinate is an entity whose federation metadata and trust relationship are vouched for by a higher-level entity in the federation.

More concretely, a subordinate is an entity for which a superior entity, such as a Trust Anchor or Intermediate Entity, can issue a Subordinate Statement. That statement is a signed Entity Statement saying, in effect:

“I, the issuer, make authoritative claims about this subject entity.”

The iss is the superior, and the sub is the subordinate.

1
2
3
4
Trust Anchor
  └── Intermediate Entity
        └── OpenID Provider
        └── Relying Party

For a trust anchor or intermediate, the supported subordinates must be defined as JSON files with the OidcFederationSubordinate format:

Relying Party Subordinate

Here is an example of an RP subordinate definition:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
{
  "entityId" : "https://rp.example.org",
  "metadata": {
    "openid_relying_party": {
      "redirect_uris": [
        "https://rp.example.org/callback"
      ],
      "application_type": "web",
      "response_types": [
        "code"
      ],
      "grant_types": [
        "authorization_code"
      ],
      "scope": "openid email profile",
      "token_endpoint_auth_method": "private_key_jwt",
      "token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg": "RS256",
      "request_object_signing_alg": "RS256",
      "jwks": {
        "keys": [
          {
            "kty": "RSA",
            "e": "AQAB",
            "use": "sig",
            "kid": "keyid",
            "n": "2moVQ...2aq7Q"
          }
        ]
      },
      "client_registration_types": [
        "explicit", "automatic"
      ],
      "client_name": "RP test"
    }
  },
  "federationKeys": [
    {
      "kty": "EC",
      "use": "sig",
      "crv": "P-256",
      "kid": "TJns",
      "x": "iLPMKMGqb7HeCnov5xBwEnq2zUbX5gNbyoVn1EHpvSI",
      "y": "1kcVTdS1_Y2_NnL0E9LpWhPWsoCNOFQR2Dd7VAJBYKY"
    }
  ]
}

OpenId Provider Subordinate

Here is an example of an OP subordinate definition, with a shortened openid_provider metadata:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
{
  "entityId" : "https://op.example.org",
  "metadata": {
    "openid_provider": {
      "issuer": "https://op.example.org",
      "authorization_endpoint": "https://op.example.org/authorize",
      "token_endpoint": "https://op.example.org/token",
      "pushed_authorization_request_endpoint": "https://op.example.org/par",
      "jwks_uri": "https://op.example.org/jwks.json",
      "client_registration_types_supported": [ "automatic" ],
      "scopes_supported": [ "openid", "profile", "email" ],
      "response_types_supported": [ "code" ],
      "grant_types_supported": [ "authorization_code", "refresh_token" ],
      "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": [ "private_key_jwt" ],
      "request_object_signing_alg_values_supported": [ "RS256", "ES256" ]
    }
  },
  "federationKeys": [
    {
      "kty": "RSA",
      "e": "AQAB",
      "use": "sig",
      "kid": "PRRz",
      "n": "vPZc7Y..."
    }
  ]
}

The metadata and federationKeys properties come both from the data in the .well-known/openid-federation endpoint. The federationKeys section is mandatory in the federation entity definitions, while metadata is optional. Metadata in a subordinate statement takes precedence over the metadata the entity publishes itself, so an empty object for an entity type, such as "openid_relying_party": {}, leaves the entity’s own metadata in effect.

Metadata Policies

A subordinate definition may also carry a metadata policy, which CAS publishes in its subordinate statement as OpenID Federation describes, to restrict or adjust the metadata of the subordinate and of every entity below it. Policies use the standard operators value, add, default, one_of, subset_of, superset_of and essential; operators beyond those are ignored by entities that do not understand them, unless they are listed as critical:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
{
  "entityId" : "https://rp.example.org",
  "metadataPolicy": {
    "openid_relying_party": {
      "scope": {
        "subset_of": [ "openid", "email", "profile" ]
      },
      "contacts": {
        "add": [ "ops@example.org" ]
      },
      "token_endpoint_auth_method": {
        "one_of": [ "private_key_jwt", "tls_client_auth" ],
        "essential": true
      }
    }
  },
  "metadataPolicyCrit": [],
  "federationKeys": [
    {
      "kty": "RSA",
      "e": "AQAB",
      "use": "sig",
      "kid": "PRRz",
      "n": "vPZc7Y..."
    }
  ]
}

A metadata policy that CAS cannot read, such as one that combines operators in a way the specification forbids, is not published. Subordinates are listed for the entity types of their metadata as well as of their metadata policy.

A subordinate definition may also carry constraints, published as they are in its subordinate statement, as OpenID Federation describes, to bound the trust chains that go through the subordinate:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
{
  "entityId" : "https://intermediate.example.org",
  "constraints": {
    "max_path_length": 1,
    "naming_constraints": {
      "permitted": [ ".example.org" ]
    },
    "allowed_entity_types": [ "openid_relying_party" ]
  },
  "federationKeys": [ ]
}

The fetch, list and trust mark status endpoints of a subordinate are left out of the federation_entity metadata of its subordinate statement, since they may only be published in the entity configuration of the subordinate.

Signed entity statements are returned from the /oidc/fetch endpoint, depending on the requested subordinate (sub request parameter). A subordinate statement carries the keys of the subordinate only. An unknown subordinate is answered with 404 and not_found, a missing sub or the entity identifier of CAS itself with 400 and invalid_request, and a subordinate defined without keys, with a metadata policy CAS cannot read, or with constraints that are not an object, with 500 and server_error; entities that issue no subordinate statements answer 404.

The /oidc/list endpoint lists the subordinates, and can filter them by entity type, with one or more entity_type request parameters, and to intermediates only, with intermediate=true. A subordinate has the entity types its definition lists in entityTypes, or, when it lists none, the entity types of its metadata; a metadata policy for an entity type does not give the subordinate that type, so a definition that only carries a policy should list its types. Filtering by trust marks is not supported and is answered with unsupported_parameter.

Resolve Endpoint

As a trust anchor or an intermediate, CAS resolves entities of the federation for others at its /oidc/resolve endpoint, advertised as federation_resolve_endpoint, as described by OpenID Federation. A GET request names the entity with sub, one or more trust anchors with trust_anchor and, optionally, the entity types whose metadata is wanted with one or more entity_type; all entity types are returned otherwise.

Requests are not authenticated by default. Client authentication can be made optional or required using CAS properties, as described by OpenID Federation: an authenticated request is a POST with the same parameters and a private_key_jwt client assertion, signed with a federation key of a subordinate of CAS as its subordinate definition holds it, whose iss and sub are the subordinate, whose aud is only the entity identifier of CAS, and which carries jti and exp; each client assertion is accepted once. The resolve response is then addressed to the subordinate with aud. The entity configuration advertises the accepted methods as federation_resolve_endpoint_auth_methods. A GET when authentication is required, or a request that does not authenticate, is answered with 401 and invalid_client; a POST when authentication is not supported with 400 and invalid_request.

  • A trust anchor resolves entities to itself. An intermediate resolves them to its trust anchors, or to its authority hints when no trust anchor is defined. Requested trust anchors that CAS does not trust are ignored.
  • CAS resolves the trust chains of the entity with the same bounds on authority hints and path length as for automatic registration, and builds its own statements itself rather than requesting them from its own endpoints. The shortest trust chain that satisfies the constraints of its statements and is not signed with a key its trust anchor has revoked is used, ending with the entity configuration of the trust anchor.
  • The metadata of each entity type is resolved with the metadata policies of the trust chain. Entity types the constraints of the chain do not allow are left out.
  • Only the trust marks of the entity that are valid, issued by issuers the trust anchor accepts for their type and active, are included. The response expires with the trust chain, or with the first of those trust marks to expire. A trust mark that cannot be checked for now, such as when its status endpoint cannot be reached, is left out, and the response is then not remembered.
  • The response is a JWT of type resolve-response+jwt, signed with the current federation key.
  • Resolved trust chains, and entities that could not be resolved, are remembered per entity and trust anchors for the period that applies to entity identifiers that could not be resolved, or until the chain or a trust mark expires, so that repeated requests do not resolve them again. That period can be tuned using CAS properties.
  • Errors are answered as JSON: a missing or malformed parameter with 400 and invalid_request; trust anchors CAS does not trust with 404 and invalid_trust_anchor; an entity without a usable trust chain to them with 400 and invalid_trust_chain; metadata the policies of the chain cannot apply to with 400 and invalid_metadata; a resolution that cannot start because too many are running, or that cannot tell about a trust anchor that cannot be reached, answers with a server error or whose historical keys cannot be read, with 503 and temporarily_unavailable, which is not remembered. An OpenID Provider answers 404 and not_found.

Entity Configuration

The entity identifier of CAS is its issuer, without a trailing slash, in every role.

CAS publishes its entity configuration at .well-known/openid-federation under its issuer, signed with its federation keys, whatever its role. As an OpenID Provider, it describes itself as openid_provider with its discovery metadata, which advertises automatic as the only client registration type; plain OpenID Connect deployments without the federation role do not advertise client registration types. When CAS also issues verifiable credentials, the entity configuration describes it as openid_credential_issuer, with the same metadata as its credential issuer metadata endpoint, and as oauth_authorization_server, which the credential issuer names as its authorization server, so that wallets of federation-based ecosystems find and trust the credential issuer through its trust chain (OpenID Federation for Wallet Architectures). When CAS presents itself to wallets as a verifier with the openid_federation client identifier prefix, the entity configuration also describes it as openid_credential_verifier, with its keys and response URI, as described in verifiable presentations. The credential issuer and authorization server entity types require the credential issuer of CAS to be the entity identifier; otherwise they are left out, with a warning.

Trust marks that trust mark issuers have issued to CAS are published in the entity configuration as trust_marks. Each trust mark is a signed JWT, given as a file, a URL or the JWT itself; files and URLs are read again each time the entity configuration is produced, so a renewed trust mark is published without a restart. The trust mark type is taken from the trust mark, and a trust mark that is about another entity, names no type or has expired is not published and is reported in the logs. Trust marks are not verified by CAS, which leaves that to the parties that resolve it, and can be defined using CAS properties.

As a trust anchor, CAS publishes in its entity configuration the trust mark types of the federation and the entities it accepts as their issuers, as trust_mark_issuers. A trust mark type listed without issuers may be issued by anyone. Both can be defined using CAS properties. A trust anchor also publishes, as trust_mark_owners, the owners of trust mark types whose issuance they delegate to other issuers, each with the keys their delegations are verified with; only the public members of those keys are published.

Trust Mark Issuer

In any role, CAS can issue trust marks, as described by OpenID Federation. Each trust mark type is defined with the entities it is issued to, how long its trust marks are valid, and optionally a logo, a reference to human-readable information and a delegation from the owner of the type, all of which can be defined using CAS properties. Nothing is stored: a trust mark is signed with the current federation key when it is requested. When CAS issues trust marks, its entity configuration advertises three endpoints, which do not require authentication by default:

  • The trust mark endpoint answers a request for a trust mark type and an entity with a trust mark of that type about that entity, typed trust-mark+jwt, or with 404 when the entity does not hold that type.
  • The trust mark status endpoint answers the status of a trust mark it was sent, in a signed status response: active; expired once the trust mark has expired; revoked when its subject no longer holds the type; or invalid when it is not typed as a trust mark or does not verify with the federation keys CAS publishes. A trust mark issued by another entity, or of a type CAS does not issue, is answered with 404.
  • The trust marked entities listing endpoint lists the entities that hold a trust mark type, optionally only the one asked for.

Requests to the trust mark endpoint can also be authenticated, as OpenID Federation allows, so that entities only obtain their own trust marks. Client authentication at that endpoint can be left off, which is the default, allowed, or required, using CAS properties, and the entity configuration advertises the choice along with the signing algorithms CAS accepts. An authenticated request is a POST that authenticates with private_key_jwt: the client assertion is signed with a federation key of the requester, as its subordinate definition holds it; its issuer and subject are the requester; its only audience is the entity identifier of CAS; and it is accepted once, until it expires. Only subordinates of CAS as a trust anchor or intermediate can therefore authenticate, and they may only ask for their own trust marks. A request that fails to authenticate, or asks for the trust mark of another entity, is answered with 401 and invalid_client, as is an unauthenticated request when client authentication is required.

Removing an entity from a trust mark type revokes the trust marks of that type it holds. A trust mark signed with a federation key that has since been retired stays active for the rest of its life, since the historical keys keep it verifiable, as OpenID Federation intends; it becomes invalid once that key is revoked.

Key Rollover

CAS signs its entity configuration and the statements it issues with its federation keys, which are kept in their own keystore and go through the same lifecycle as the OpenID Connect keys, as OpenID Federation describes for rolling keys over:

  • A new keystore starts with a current key, which signs, and a future key, which is only published. A keystore that holds a single key without a lifecycle state keeps working; its key is current. A keystore that holds no keys is given new ones, and one that cannot be read stops CAS from starting rather than being replaced.
  • The entity configuration publishes the current, future and previous keys, so a key is known to the federation before it starts signing and after it stopped.
  • Rotation makes the future key current, the current key previous, and publishes a new future key. When the keystore has no future key yet, rotation only publishes one, and the next rotation makes it current.
  • Revocation retires the previous keys: they leave the entity configuration and are kept, without their private keys, as historical keys, with the time they were retired as their expiration.
  • Every role publishes its historical keys at the federation historical keys endpoint, advertised in its entity configuration, as a JWK set signed with the current key.
  • A key can also be revoked, for instance when its private key is believed compromised. A key that is still published leaves the entity configuration at once and is published as a historical key that expires at the time of the revocation and is marked revoked, with that time and the reason, such as compromised, superseded or a reason defined by the federation. A key that was already retired keeps its expiration and is marked revoked as well. When the revoked key was signing, the future key starts signing, or a new key when there is none, and a new future key is published. A key that signs without having been published before is unknown to superiors until they update their subordinate statements about CAS.

Rotation and revocation can run on a schedule, which can be defined using CAS properties, or be triggered on demand, which is also how a key is revoked. A scheduled run only changes keys once they are old enough, at half the time between two runs of its schedule: a scheduled rotation makes the future key current only once that key has been published that long, and a scheduled revocation retires a previous key only once it has been previous that long. A schedule that runs again soon after another run leaves the keys as they are: after a restart, or on another node that shares the keystore file and reads it after the change. Nodes whose schedules run at the very same moment may each change the keys, so in a cluster the schedules are best enabled on a single node. On demand, rotation and revocation apply at once:

oidcFederationJwks
CAS endpoint4 operationsNot exposed by defaultcas-server-support-oidc-federation
1

Include the module that provides this endpoint in the WAR overlay:

1
2
3
4
5
<dependency>
    <groupId>org.apereo.cas</groupId>
    <artifactId>cas-server-support-oidc-federation</artifactId>
    <version>${cas.version}</version>
</dependency>
1
implementation "org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-oidc-federation:${project.'cas.version'}"
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
dependencyManagement {
    imports {
        mavenBom "org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-bom:${project.'cas.version'}"
    }
}

dependencies {
    implementation "org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-oidc-federation"
}
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
dependencies {
    /*
        The following platform references are included automatically and are listed for reference only.

        implementation enforcedPlatform("org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-bom:${project.'cas.version'}")
        implementation platform(org.springframework.boot.gradle.plugin.SpringBootPlugin.BOM_COORDINATES)
        
    */
    implementation "org.apereo.cas:cas-server-support-oidc-federation"
}
2

Turn the endpoint on and expose it over the web. One entry covers every operation. By default only info, health and status are exposed.

1
2
management.endpoint.oidcFederationJwks.access=UNRESTRICTED
management.endpoints.web.exposure.include=oidcFederationJwks

Endpoints may be mapped to other paths. For example, to serve health at healthcheck:

1
management.endpoints.web.path-mapping.health=healthcheck

The keystore must be writable for rotation and revocation; CAS writes a new keystore file next to it, with the permissions, owner and group of the keystore where the file system allows it, and not readable by a group other than the keystore’s; a new keystore is readable by its owner only where the file system has such permissions. The new file then replaces the keystore at once, so that the keystore is never read half written. A keystore that is a symbolic link is written where the link points. Where the file system does not allow replacing the keystore while it is in use, as Windows may, the keys are not saved and stay as they were. CAS reads the keystore again when it changes, so nodes that share the keystore file sign with the same keys; nodes that do not share it each have their own keys, which superiors would all have to know. Superiors verify the entity configuration of CAS with the keys of their subordinate statement about it: when CAS is a subordinate, its future key should be added to the subordinate definition at each superior before the rotation makes it current. Likewise, entities that trust a CAS trust anchor with keys obtained out of band should be given its future key ahead of time.

Trust Anchors

An OpenID Provider accepts the trust chains of relying parties that end at one of its trust anchors. Each trust anchor is defined by its entity identifier and its keys, which should be obtained out of band, as OpenID Federation recommends, and may be given as a file, a URL or the JSON web key set itself; private key members are ignored. A trust anchor defined without keys is trusted with the keys of its own entity configuration, that is with whoever answers at its entity identifier. Trust anchors and their keys can be defined using CAS properties.

The authority hints are the entities directly above CAS, which issue subordinate statements about it; they are not trust anchors unless they are also defined as such. When no trust anchor is defined, CAS uses the authority hints as trust anchors, with the keys of their own entity configuration, and logs a warning.

Automatic Registration

As an OpenID Provider, CAS registers relying parties of the federation automatically, as described by OpenID Federation, without any prior registration step:

  • The relying party uses its entity identifier as its client id, which must be an https URL. On the first authorization or pushed authorization request, CAS resolves the trust chains of the relying party up to one of the trust anchors, and registers the resolved openid_relying_party metadata as an application that expires with the trust chain and is resolved again shortly before.
  • Each redirect URI of the relying party is matched exactly, whatever characters it contains.
  • The relying party authenticates with private_key_jwt, assumed when its metadata names no method, or with tls_client_auth. A relying party whose metadata names any other method is not registered, and so is a relying party that publishes its keys at a jwks_uri that is not an https URL.
  • Every authorization request proves that the relying party controls its keys. It either carries a request object signed with a key of the relying party’s metadata, whose iss and client_id are the entity identifier, whose aud is only the issuer of CAS, with jti and exp and without sub, valid for 10 minutes at most, or it refers with request_uri to a pushed authorization request for which the relying party authenticated itself. Client assertions may be addressed to the issuer of CAS as well as to its token endpoint, except at the pushed authorization endpoint, where the client assertion of an automatically registered relying party must be addressed to the issuer of CAS only, as OpenID Federation requires; otherwise the request is refused with 401 and invalid_client.
  • A request object is used once: CAS remembers its jti for as long as the request object could be accepted, and at least for the lifetime of transient session tickets, during which only the very same request object is accepted again, as happens when the browser returns from the login.
  • A request object may also be encrypted to CAS; it is decrypted first, and the signed request object inside is checked as above.
  • Requests that fail these checks are refused with invalid_request and are never redirected to the relying party.
  • The relying party that must prove its keys is the client of the authorization request: the client_id parameter or, when the request carries none, the client_id of its request object, on the OpenID Connect and the OAuth authorization endpoints alike, including the OpenID Connect authorization and pushed authorization endpoints that also answer outside the OpenID Connect base path, whatever the encoding of the path. A request object whose client_id differs from the client_id parameter is refused for every client, as OpenID Connect requires.
  • The constraints that trust anchors and intermediates set in their subordinate statements apply to every trust chain of a relying party, whether resolved or sent, as OpenID Federation requires: the maximum number of intermediates below the entity that sets them, the permitted and excluded domain names of the entities below it, and the entity types they may have, which must include openid_relying_party. A trust chain that breaks any of them is not used. The trust chains of trust mark issuers are held to the same constraints, except for entity types.
  • The metadata of a relying party is resolved from its trust chain as OpenID Federation describes: the metadata the immediate superior states about the relying party takes precedence over the metadata the relying party publishes, and the metadata policies of the trust anchor and intermediates are then merged, from the trust anchor down, and applied. scope is handled as a list of scope values. Operators beyond the standard ones are ignored, unless a statement of the chain lists them as critical, in which case the trust chain is not used. A trust chain whose policies conflict, or whose policies the metadata does not satisfy, such as a missing essential parameter, is not used either.
  • The keys a trust anchor is trusted with out of band may still list a key the trust anchor has since revoked. When the trust anchor publishes its historical keys, CAS reads them, verified with those keys, and does not use a trust chain in which the trust anchor signed with a key it marks revoked, or with a key it had already retired when it issued the statement. The historical keys are always found through the entity configuration CAS fetches from the trust anchor, never through one a trust chain sent by a relying party carries; they must be served over https, and each must carry its expiration, as the specification requires. A trust anchor that advertises no historical keys has revoked none. CAS keeps the historical keys of a trust anchor for a minute. When its entity configuration or the historical keys it advertises cannot be obtained or verified, CAS cannot tell whether the key was revoked and does not use the trust chain for now; the relying party is not remembered as unresolved on that account, so it can be registered as soon as the trust anchor can be reached again. Every statement of a trust chain must name the key it is signed with, as the specification requires; a trust chain with a statement that does not is not used.
  • The metadata superiors assert about a relying party, and their metadata policies, apply only to the entity types its entity configuration publishes: an entity that publishes no openid_relying_party metadata is not registered, whatever its superiors state.
  • Resolving trust chains is bounded: CAS follows a limited number of authority hints from any entity configuration and accepts a limited number of intermediates between the relying party and a trust anchor, and an entity identifier whose trust chains could not be resolved is not resolved again for a while. Meanwhile, a registration that could not be refreshed is kept as it is. Each resolution sends a limited number of requests, 50 by default, counting entity configurations, subordinate statements, historical keys and trust mark status requests together, including those for the issuers of its trust marks; a statement fetched once is reused within the same resolution, and a resolution that needs more fails. The historical keys of trust anchors are not counted. Each resolution must also be done within a limited time, 10 seconds by default, all of its requests together, however slowly the other side answers, and every response is limited in size; the time limit covers each whole request, from the host name lookup and the TLS handshake to the last byte of the response. Requests are only sent over https, never to link-local, unspecified or multicast addresses such as the metadata service of a cloud provider, including such addresses embedded in IPv6 addresses, use the TLS settings of CAS and do not follow redirects. Addresses written in a URL are always checked, and host names when CAS resolves them, as it does to connect directly or through a SOCKS proxy; host names sent through an HTTP proxy of the JVM, or through a SOCKS proxy when CAS cannot resolve them, are resolved by the proxy, which then decides where they may go. A limited number of requests run at the same time, those abandoned at the deadline included. A trust anchor that does not accept a connection or answer in the time it is given, or that answers with a server error, is treated as unreachable. A resolution that runs out of time or requests, or finds no room among the running requests, cannot tell whether a relying party has a valid trust chain or trust mark: it is unavailable, and the relying party is not remembered as unresolved. A limited number of resolutions run at the same time, 10 by default, for automatic registration and the resolve endpoint together; one that cannot start within a second fails without the entity being remembered as unresolved, and so does a registration that cannot get its turn within a few seconds. Using the trust chain a relying party sent and, when it cannot be used, resolving its trust chains is a single resolution, within one time limit and request budget. A relying party that is not registered yet and cannot be registered for now is answered with temporarily_unavailable rather than as an unknown client. These limits can be tuned using CAS properties.
  • A relying party whose metadata asks for pairwise subject identifiers receives them, calculated with a salt that can be defined using CAS properties, so that they stay the same whenever the relying party is registered again and are shared by relying parties of the same sector; the salt is never written into its registration. Without that salt, such a relying party is not registered. Its sector must be its own: its sector identifier URI, when it has one, must be an https URL, is fetched as a request of the resolution and must list all of its redirect URIs, and without one, its redirect URIs must all be in the same sector, read as they are when identifiers are calculated: an http or https redirect URI on a host other than a loopback one is in the sector of its host, and any other one in the relying party’s own. A sector identifier document that cannot be fetched for now leaves the relying party unregistered for now, without remembering it as unresolved, and its other trust anchors are tried.
  • A relying party may send its trust chain in the trust_chain header of its request object or client assertion, as OpenID Federation allows. Whenever CAS would resolve the relying party, to register it, to refresh its registration or after a key rollover, it uses that chain instead, once fully verified: the chain must start with the entity configuration of the relying party, end at a trust anchor whose keys are defined out of band, verify statement by statement from those keys, not have expired and not exceed the maximum path length; the required trust marks and the metadata policies of the chain apply as usual. Statements are public, so a chain alone does not show who sends it: it is used only when its entity configuration was not issued before the one the current registration was built from, and when the request object or client assertion that carries it is signed with the keys it resolves to. A chain replayed by someone else, even a genuine one, cannot keep or bring back keys the relying party has replaced. CAS resolves the trust chains itself when the sent chain cannot be used, and always when the trust anchor is trusted with the keys of its own entity configuration, which a sent chain could forge.
  • A relying party that rolls its keys over is resolved again before its registration expires, as OpenID Federation allows: when a request object or a client assertion it sends, at any endpoint, verifies with none of the keys of its registration, CAS resolves its trust chains first and then checks the request with the keys the relying party now publishes. Each relying party is resolved this way at most once in the same period that applies to entity identifiers that could not be resolved, so objects signed with keys a relying party never published cannot make CAS fetch its statements over and over. Such objects count against that period whoever sends them, and the relying party is then resolved from what it publishes, so a relying party should publish a new key before it signs with it.

Required Trust Marks

An OpenID Provider may only register relying parties that hold specific trust marks, such as a certification or a membership the federation vouches for. The required trust mark types can be defined using CAS properties. For each of them, the entity configuration of the relying party must carry a trust mark of that type that:

  • is a signed JWT typed trust-mark+jwt that names its signing key, is about the relying party, and has been issued and has not expired;
  • is issued by an entity that the trust anchor of the relying party’s trust chain accepts for that type in its trust_mark_issuers;
  • verifies with the federation keys of its issuer: the trust anchor’s own keys, or the keys of the issuer’s entity configuration, whose trust chain must end at the same trust anchor. A trust mark signed with a key the issuer has since retired verifies with that key as the issuer’s historical keys publish it, provided the key was never revoked and the trust mark was issued before the key was retired. The historical keys of an issuer are kept for a minute, except when they could not be requested: a resolution that has used up its requests verifies the trust mark with the current keys of its issuer only, and one that runs out of time or finds no room among the running requests is unavailable;
  • carries a valid delegation from the owner of the type, when the trust anchor names one in trust_mark_owners;
  • is reported active by the issuer’s trust mark status endpoint, when the issuer publishes one; a status endpoint or historical keys endpoint that cannot be reached for now or answers with a server error makes the resolution unavailable rather than the trust mark invalid, unless another trust mark of the type is valid, or the relying party lacks a valid trust mark of another required type; the endpoint must be an https URL. So does a trust anchor that cannot be reached while the trust chain of the issuer is resolved. An issuer whose endpoints keep answering with server errors thus keeps the relying parties holding its trust marks from being remembered as unresolved, so they are resolved again with each request, each time within the limits of a resolution.

A relying party that lacks a valid trust mark of a required type is not registered, and the reason is reported in the logs. Trust marks are checked again whenever the registration is refreshed.

An authorization request passed by value travels through the CAS login as part of its service URL, and CAS does not match service URLs beyond a maximum length, which can be adjusted using CAS properties. A request object that carries its trust_chain is several kilobytes long: relying parties should send it with a pushed authorization request, as OpenID Federation suggests, or the limit must be raised.